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In this edition of
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors
examine how the U.S. Supreme Court could
issue a prospective-only ruling in South
Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.
The primary issue that the U.S. Supreme
Court will address in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.
is whether the Court should overturn its longstanding physical presence rule. However, if the
Court were to overturn this rule, it may also
choose to resolve a second question — whether
its reversal would apply retroactively or
prospectively only. If the holding were to apply

retroactively, that would mean that remote
vendors could be liable for years of back taxes,
with no real opportunity to collect those taxes
from their customers. The impact of that could
be highly problematic.1
The retroactivity issue is of critical
importance, and it did receive attention from
both parties in their merits briefs, as well as in
2
the briefs of many amici. But the issue was not
nearly as fleshed out as the substantive issue in
the case, and the retroactivity issue deserves
more discussion to make clear that the Court is
not bound to reverse Quill on a retroactive basis
either now or later (if it is to repeal Quill at all).
This article elaborates by evaluating the
doctrinal foundation of the Court’s retroactivity
doctrine and by analyzing why Wayfair differs
from cases in which the Court required its
decisions to be applied retroactively. To
summarize the argument, a prospective-only
application of a new rule in Wayfair would be
more than justified and would be consistent
with the Court’s doctrine in this area of law.
The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine
One of the foundational elements of the rule
of law and American jurisprudence is that
people should have an opportunity to
understand what the law is before being held

1

That is, assuming that any states would act to collect retroactive tax
liabilities, an eventuality that 40 states argue is unlikely in their amicus
brief. States’ Amicus Brief at 19-20, South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
2

See, e.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 48-51, South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., No.
17-494 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); and Respondents’ Brief at 62-65, South Dakota
v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018); States’ Amicus Brief at 1921, The argument of this essay elaborates on arguments made in the
States’ brief in particular.
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accountable for violations of its mandates. One
aspect of this principle is that we generally
disfavor retroactively punishing conduct based
on new laws. This is reflected in various places
in our legal system, including the U.S.
Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto
laws, and in a general judicial presumption that
legislation is applied only prospectively.4
That general rule gives way in the realm of
judicial pronouncements, however, where there
has developed a norm of retroactivity. This arises
from a prominent theory of judicial power that
reasons that judges have the power to issue
retroactive decisions because their role is to
announce what the law “is” or “was,” not what it
“shall be.”5 A statute that is held to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, for example, is not
inconsistent only from that point on or only
regarding the parties involved in the particular
case. The statute was always inconsistent with the
Constitution. Any other approach would allow
Courts to be the writer of laws rather than the
interpreter of laws, according to this philosophy.
The Supreme Court has struggled with this
issue and with other issues that retroactivity can
cause. Applying a constitutional holding
retroactively could impose significant costs on
parties who have relied on the Court’s prior
precedent or on the law as it was enacted. That
cost might outweigh the benefits of a retroactive
application, and a prospective ruling might
provide greater net benefits. The Court addressed
this tension with its 1971 decision in Chevron Oil v.
Huson6 in which it pulled together three factors
from its prior cases for evaluating whether a
prospective-only ruling is appropriate. Under the
Chevron Oil framework, the Court looks to (1)
3

Lon L. Fuller, “The Morality of Law,” 51-53 Yale U.S. Press 1969)
(referring to the prospectivity of law as one of his eight criteria for an act
to be considered as “law”); and Landgraf v. USI Film Production, 511 U.S.
244, 265 (1994) (“the presumption against retroactive legislation is
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine
centuries older than our Republic”).

whether the Court’s decision establishes a new
principle of law, either by overruling prior law or
by deciding a question of first impression that was
not “clearly foreshadowed”; (2) whether
retroactive application would undermine the
operation of the new rule, given its purpose and
effect; and (3) whether retroactive application
would cause injustice or hardship.7
Chevron Oil and Tax Statutes
The Chevron Oil factors suggest that the Court
could easily justify applying a reversal of Quill on
a prospective basis only. The Court clearly would
be overruling prior law. Retroactive application
would undermine the purpose of the Court’s
dormant commerce clause doctrine, which is to
protect interstate commerce while respecting state
8
autonomy. And a retroactive holding would
clearly cause injustice or hardship on remote
vendors — they could be liable for years of past
taxes that they otherwise could have collected
from their customers. Retroactive liability
wouldn’t just place them in the same position as if
the physical presence rule were never imposed by
the Court, it would make them worse off.
Why does Wayfair argue that a reversal of
Quill would have to apply retroactively? That
position stems from a gradual erosion of Chevron
Oil that can be seen in the Court’s cases since the
1970s. Key among those are three state tax cases
from the early 1990s. 9 The first, American
10
Trucking Associations v. Smith, was a case
involving a flat highway tax identical to one the
Court had struck down as unconstitutionally
discriminatory during pendency of that
11
dispute. The issue presented to the Court was
whether that intervening decision would be
applied to the case at hand. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor applied Chevron Oil and answered
that question in the negative, but her opinion on

4

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 3; and U.S. Const. Art. I, section 10, cl.
1. See generally Richard S. Kay, “Retroactivity and Prospectivity of
Judgments in American Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol.
62, July 2014, at 37, 38.
5

See Kay, id. at 49-50 (describing this judicial philosophy and likening
it to a “Blackstonian view of adjudication”); and American Trucking
Association, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“prospective
decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say
what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be”).
6

Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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7

Id. at 106-107.

8

See Thimmesch, “A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause,” Mich. L. Rev. Online (2018), at 101, 104-105.
9

The Court had, at that time, already retreated from its willingness to
apply its decisions on a prospective-only basis in criminal procedure
matters. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1986).
10
11

496 U.S. 167 (1990).
See American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
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that issue garnered the support of only a plurality
of the justices.12
The next year, the Supreme Court decided
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, which
involved the question whether the decision in
13
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias would apply
14
retroactively. Bacchus was another
discrimination case, and the Court determined
that it did apply retroactively notwithstanding
Chevron Oil, but it could not muster a majority
opinion on why. O’Connor’s dissent, which Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy joined, applied Chevron Oil and
mentioned the “potentially devastating liability”
15
that retroactivity can cause. The majority
opinion did not apply Chevron Oil at all.
James Beam left the status of the Chevron Oil
doctrine unclear, but the Court struck a much
deeper blow to that doctrine very shortly
16
thereafter in Harper v. Virginia. That case again
involved the retroactivity of a court’s decision that
a state statute was unconstitutionally
17
discriminatory. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote
the majority opinion in Harper and all but closed
the opportunity for prospective-only decisions.
After reviewing Chevron Oil and its progeny, he
noted that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal
law to the parties before it, that rule is the
controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in
all cases still open on direct review and as
to all events, regardless of whether such

12

American Trucking Associations v. Smith, 496 U.S. at 179-183. Notably,
Justice O’Connor justified prospectivity based, in part, on the inequity of
potentially retroactively imposing taxes on previously “favored
taxpayers.” Id. at 182-183. Justice Scalia joined the majority in denying
relief to the taxpayer, but he did not agree with the plurality opinion on
retroactivity.Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
“the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular
decision could take prospective form does not make sense”).
13

486 U.S. 263 (1984).

14

501 U.S. 529 (1991).

15

James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 558 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

16

509 U.S. 86 (1993). Note that this is the first of these cases that
occurred after Quill was handed down in 1992.
17

This case was a bit different in that the statute at issue was not
discriminatory under the dormant commerce clause, but in violation of
the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Harper, 509 U.S. at
89-91; see also Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
(1989).

events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule.18
For many, that seems to have marked the end
of the retroactivity debate.
Prospective Rulings After Harper
Thomas’s opinion in Harper certainly did not
seem to leave a great amount of room for
prospective-only judgments. But it didn’t entirely
foreclose them either. The precise issue addressed
by the Harper Court was whether lower courts
could reject retroactivity when the Court had not
done so itself.19 This says nothing of whether the
Court can issue a prospective-only judgment of its
own accord.
The real takeaway from Harper is about the
Court’s desire for consistency of application
between parties. The Court was critical of
“selective prospectivity,” which is when “a court
applies the new rule to the parties before it but not
to other conduct predating the court’s
judgment.”20 That is inconsistent with many
justices’ views of how courts and the rule of law
should operate. But it does not mean that Chevron
Oil is bad law or that the Court cannot issue
prospective-only rulings in appropriate
circumstances. The Court still has that option, and
Wayfair presents the precise fact situation for
which that is proper. We base this conclusion on
several factors.
To start, much judicial action under the
dormant commerce clause is quasi-legislative in
nature. The dormant commerce clause represents
the Court’s attempt to protect the negative
implications of the commerce clause, which
directly grants Congress an affirmative power to
21
regulate interstate commerce. It is only when
Congress does not act under the commerce clause

18

Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.

19

Id. at 97-98 (rejecting the Virginia Supreme Court’s application of
Chevron Oil “[w]hen this Court does not ‘reserve the question of whether
its holding should be applied to the parties before it’”); and id. at 98
(noting that state courts have a “legal imperative ‘to apply a rule of
federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done
so’”) (emphasis added). Lower courts have latched on to that language to
preserve some room for prospective-only rulings. See Daniel Hemel,
“There Is No Retroactivity Concern With Overruling Quill,” Whatever
Source Derived (Jan. 28, 2018).
20
21

Kay, supra note 4, at 48 (internal quotations omitted).
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
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that the Court has a role under the negative or
dormant commerce clause. If the Court acts,
though, it does so to some extent by exercising
federal legislativelike power to proscribe some
state conduct; this is of course why the clause
remains controversial among some justices. As
noted above, the Court’s default position
regarding legislative enactments is that they
22
apply prospectively only. The table is flipped, and
so if there is any area of the law where the
presumption in favor of retroactivity should be
relaxed it is regarding the dormant commerce
clause. The special role of the dormant commerce
clause is further indicated by the fact that, unlike
in other areas of constitutional law, this is an area
in which Congress can overturn a constitutional
ruling of the Supreme Court.23
Of course, much of the erosion of Chevron Oil
in the early 1990s occurred in dormant
commerce clause cases. However, all those cases
raised the issue of unlawful discrimination, an
aspect of the dormant commerce clause that even
Justice Antonin Scalia embraced.24 The states
involved had collected taxes in unconstitutional
ways, and issuing a retroactive ruling meant that
the states had to provide relief to all parties
affected by those actions — not just to the litigant
who brought the challenge. To hold to the
contrary would allow states to act in a
discriminatory way with no real downside. They
25
would get to keep the resulting revenue.
The analysis here could be put another way.
Though surely the Court did not rely on Chevron

22

Landgraf v. USI Film Production, 511 U.S. 244, 265, (1994) (“the
presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our
Republic”).
23

See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (noting that “Congress has the ultimate
power to resolve” dormant commerce clause issues).
24

Not necessarily enthusiastically. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (“I will, on stare decisis grounds, enforce a
self-executing `negative’ Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against
a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and
(2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law
previously held unconstitutional by this Court. Applying this approach
— or at least the second part of it — is not always easy, since once one
gets beyond facial discrimination our negative-Commerce-Clause
jurisprudence becomes (and long has been) a `quagmire.’”) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).

Oil in these cases, we might say that these cases
should have gone the same way even if the Court
had applied Chevron Oil’s three factors. In a
discrimination case, the Court is applying wellestablished old rules, and injustice would be
caused by prospective-only application, as
opposed to retroactive application.
Thus, a ruling for South Dakota in Wayfair
would be fundamentally different from these
other post-Chevron Oil cases because the issue in
this case is not about state discrimination. This
observation has several implications. First,
ruling prospectively would not permit the states
to retain any ill-gotten gains. Second, and
conversely, ruling prospectively would protect
remote vendors who relied on a prior ruling by
the Court. These vendors did not trench upon the
polestar of the dormant commerce clause,
namely the anti-discrimination principle, nor
commit any other wrong, and so placing the
burden of the Court’s mistake on these vendors
goes to exactly the concern with injustice that
animates Chevron Oil’s third prong.26 Returning
to our alternative framing, the Court has not
encountered a case in which prospectivity is so
important as in Wayfair, and should return to
application of Chevron Oil.
Taken together, the legal issue and the factual
posture presented in Wayfair are sufficiently
different from the traditional cases that have
come before the Court that a prospective-only
ruling is more than justified on those grounds.
Retroactive Application Would Unduly Burden
Interstate Commerce
Even if most of the justices do not agree that
Chevron Oil is still valid or that a prospectiveonly ruling is otherwise proper, the Court could
still effectively prohibit states from imposing
retroactive liabilities on vendors post-Quill. That
is because the application of retroactive liabilities
would violate the dormant commerce clause by
imposing undue burdens on interstate
commerce.

25

States could alternatively seek to collect tax from the previously
favored class of in-state taxpayers, but that could obviously prove to be
difficult. See Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John A.
Swain, State Taxation, para. 4.17 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing potential
remedies for state tax statutes determined to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory).
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26

Of course, concern with the reliance interest of vendors might lead
one to the conclusion that Quill should not be overturned at all, but this
can’t be correct. Mistakes that generate reliance cannot become
unassailable, though rule of law considerations clearly indicate the
Court must proceed with care.
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Understanding this argument starts with
first appreciating that the Court’s current nexus
doctrine serves as nothing more than a proxy for
assessing when a state tax collection requirement
burdens interstate commerce in a way that is not
27
justified by the local interest in tax collection.
This type of balancing is not a tax-specific task; it
is something the Court does regarding all types
of state regulations. In nontax situations, the
Court does not use a nexus test though. It applies
something referred to as Pike balancing.28 The
Pike formulation is as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser
29
impact on interstate activities.
That balancing approach is intended to
identify state regulations that go “too far” and
30
that thus unduly burden interstate commerce.
The Court has found it difficult to apply this test
31
to particular facts, but the imposition of
retroactive liabilities only on vendors engaged in
interstate commerce could easily be characterized

as a state action that unduly burdens interstate
commerce using this approach.
That conclusion stems from first identifying
the burden that retroactive liabilities would
impose on vendors. In this situation, the burden
of a retroactive statute would be that vendors who
relied on the physical presence rule would find
themselves liable for years of back taxes. And
those back taxes wouldn’t be taxes they would
have paid from their own funds in any event.
They otherwise would have collected the tax from
their customers — and maybe even have received
compensation for doing so under states’ vendorcompensation programs. Retroactive liability in
this context would be an incredibly high burden.
If current estimates are to be believed, we are
talking about liabilities in the tens of billions of
dollars per year.32 Multiply that by many years, or
decades, of non-collection, and we are talking
about a huge potential liability for remote
vendors. That burden could bankrupt many
online vendors.
That burden is also particularly undue because
it would arise from retailers’ reliance on the Court
and its prevailing constitutional interpretation
and not from their own ignorance of the law or
from aggressive tax positions. States also had the
opportunity to collect this revenue in past years
from their state residents or by challenging Quill
themselves.33 They had mechanisms available to
collect this tax without imposing this burden on
vendors who relied on the Court’s prevailing
constitutional interpretation. The imposition of
retroactive liabilities would thus fairly be called
into question under Pike.
Resolving Wayfair Without a
Retroactivity Problem

27

See Thimmesch, supra note 8, at 106-108; see also Amicus Curiae
Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner at 15-16, South Dakota
v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018); and Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19, South Dakota v.
Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
28

This stems from the application of that balancing test in Pike v.
Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
29

Id. (internal citation omitted).

30

See South Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945).

31

See Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (noting the
“institutional difficulty” of doing Pike balancing); see also Dan T. Coenen,
“Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State SelfPromotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause,” 95 Iowa L. Rev.
541, 568-569, 624-627 (2010) (questioning Pike’s balancing test); Brannon
P. Denning, “Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,”
50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 453-458 (2008) (noting common critiques of
Pike’s balancing test); and Donald H. Regan, “The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,”
84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (arguing that “[d]espite what the Court has
said, it has not been balancing”).

The foregoing analysis reveals that the Court
could resolve Wayfair (or a post-Wayfair case) in
several ways without permitting retroactive
liabilities for remote vendors who relied on Quill.
First, it could explicitly make its reversal of Quill

32

Donald Bruce, William F. Fox, and LeAnn Luna, “E-Tailer Sales Tax
Nexus and State Tax Policies,” 68 Nat’l Tax J. 735, 736 (2015); and U.S.
Government Accountability Office, “States Could Gain Revenue From
Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience
Compliance Costs,” GAO-18-114 (Nov. 2017).
33

See Hemel, supra note 19.
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prospective only, based on Chevron Oil. The
equities certainly lay with this option and it is not
foreclosed by existing law.
The facts in Wayfair also present a particularly
favorable case for the Court to issue a prospectiveonly ruling — based on Chevron Oil without
undermining the adjudicatory principle that the
law should apply equally to all similarly situated
parties. Prospective-only judgments arguably
violate that principle because they allow the
parties to a particular case to be governed by the
“new law” while other parties who engaged in the
same activity during the same period are not.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II offered a direct
critique of that aspect of prospective-only
judgments, labeling the issuance of such a ruling
as “[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and
then permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new
34
rule.” If this is a concern of the current justices, it
is not one that is implicated by Wayfair.
There are several features of this litigation that
permit the justices to avoid this “selective
prospectivity” worry. First, South Dakota is not
trying to collect taxes from remote vendors for
any prior period; the state drafted its law so that it
imposed tax collection obligations only for
35
periods after the law is upheld in court. Second,
because of the procedural posture of the case,
there are not specific litigants who would be
subject to a different rule. This case came to the
courts as an action for declaratory judgment.
Thus, the Court could overrule Quill on a
prospective basis and uphold the South Dakota
law without giving rise to any inconsistent
application of the law to other parties. This is also
not a situation in which South Dakota would
benefit from the Court’s ruling to the exclusion of
other states. To the contrary, a prospective-only
ruling would put all states — and all vendors —

in the same position for all periods of time. None
could impose tax collection obligations based on
economic nexus concepts before the Court’s
decision. Prospectively applying a reversal of
Quill in Wayfair would not involve “selective
36
prospectivity.” Prospectivity would be the
position for all.
Alternatively, the Court could apply its
holding prospectively but narrow Chevron Oil
further. The Court might take note, for instance, of
the special common law nature of the dormant
commerce clause or the federalism implication if
retroactivity concerns are to prevent the Court
from overturning incorrect limitations on state
power.
There are more options. The Court could
uphold the South Dakota law but clarify in dicta
that a retroactive statute would have posed
serious constitutional concerns. Alternatively, the
Court could explain in dicta that a state seeking to
impose a use tax collection obligation
retroactively would likely face an uphill battle
under Pike. Or the Court can say nothing and
instead rely on the lower courts to apply Pike and
the presumption against retroactive legislation in
the first instance.
In the end, this discussion shows that a
reversal of Quill would not necessarily mean a
world where vendors could face retroactive
liability because they relied on the physical
presence rule of Quill. A more rational result can
easily be obtained. The Court should not be
swayed by arguments to the contrary.


34

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
35

The law allowed the state to file a declaratory judgment action to
determine the permissibility of the statute’s economic nexus provisions.
S.B. 106 section 2. Also, the filing of such an action operated as an
injunction against the state from enforcing the legislation’s tax collection
obligations. Id. at section 3. Section 5 of the law provides that “[n]o
obligation to remit the sales tax required . . . may be applied
retroactively.” Id. at section 5.
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36

See supra note 20.
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